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How To Select A Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDoS’ Mitigation Service

Late last month, two members of the hacker group LulzSec pleaded guilty to launching distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against entities ranging from the state of Arizona to Nintendo to the CIA. Yet despite extensive media coverage of such attacks, chief information security officers are still surprised when their companies get hit. This is not an unforeseeable lightning bolt from the blue, people. The cyber world is full of anonymous arsonists, and too many businesses are operating without a fire department on call. A few sprinklers won’t cut it when things flare out of control. Firewalls and intrusion-prevention system appliances are no substitute for specialized DDoS backup when an attack escalates. Proactively securing a mitigation service can be a good insurance policy–in fact, it’s better than insurance, which pays off only after damage is done. That’s because mitigation services are designed to prevent destruction from occurring in the first place. Not only can a mitigation service act as a deterrent–many attackers will move on to easier prey when they see an initial DDoS attack fail–but these providers have the capacity and expertise to rapidly scale DDoS countermeasures against coordinated, professional attacks. That can mean keeping your website online even under heavy bombardment. Big And Small Companies At Risk Denial-of-service attacks used to be something that happened to other people, those with high online visibility. Not anymore. “We’ve seen very small companies come to us and they can’t figure out why they’re under attack,” says Chris Richter, VP of security products and services at Savvis. They ask, “‘What have we done?’” Blame the proliferation of prepackaged DDoS toolkits, such as the Low Orbit Ion Cannon and Dirt Jumper, for the fact that no one’s safe. Like any brute-force tactic, DDoS relies on the fact that any attack, even the most rudimentary, repeated with sufficient volume and frequency, can effectively shut down a network or website. Botnets often span thousands or millions of systems worldwide; Akamai, for example, provides a real-time attack heat map. In early July, attack rates were almost 30% above normal, with hot spots in Delaware and Italy. Geographic dispersion, coupled with network traffic crafted to look like legitimate connections from normal users, makes DDoS attacks both extremely effective and difficult to defeat if you’re not an expert with the right tools. There are three main distributed denial-of-service categories: > > Volumetric attacks overwhelm WAN circuits with tens of gigabits per second of meaningless traffic–so-called ICMP or UDP floods. > > Layer 3 attacks abuse TCP. For example, SYN floods overload network equipment by starting but never completing thousands of TCP sessions using forged sender addresses. SYN floods can be in excess of 1 million packets per second, largely in response to the wider deployment of hardware countermeasures on firewalls and other security appliances, says Neal Quinn, COO of DDoS mitigation specialist Prolexic. > > Layer 7 floods use HTTP GET or POST requests to overload application and Web servers. From the attacker’s perspective, L7 exploits aren’t anonymous. The attacking client’s identity (IP address) is exposed because a TCP handshake must be completed. Attackers who use this approach consider the risk outweighed by the technique’s effectiveness at much lower volumes and the traffic’s stealthy nature. Requests are designed to look like normal Web traffic, factors that make L7 attacks hard to detect. Our InformationWeek 2012 Strategic Security Survey shows that the increasing sophistication of threats is the most-cited reason for worry among respondents who say their orgs are more vulnerable now than in 2011, and L7 attacks are certainly sophisticated. They’re also getting more common: Mark Teolis, founder and CEO of DOSarrest , a DDoS mitigation service, says 85% of the attacks his company sees have a Layer 7 component. Attackers leveraging L7 are often developers; they may do some reconnaissance on a website, looking for page requests that aren’t cacheable and are very CPU-intensive–things like filling a shopping cart, searching a database, or posting a complex form. Teolis says that a mere 2 to 3 Mbps increase in specially crafted L7 traffic can be crippling. “We’ve had gaming sites tell us they can handle 30,000 customers, but if 100 hit this one thing, it’ll bring down the entire site,” he says. Layer 7 attacks are tough to defeat not only because the incremental traffic is minimal, but because it mimics normal user behavior. Teolis has seen attacks where an individual bot may hit a site only once or twice an hour–but there are 20,000 bots involved. Conventional network security appliances just can’t handle that kind of scenario. And meanwhile, legitimate customers can’t reach your site. Why Us? The motivations for a DDoS attack are as varied as the perpetrators. For many, it’s just business, with targets strategically chosen by cyber criminals. Others are political–a prime example is LulzSec hitting the Arizona Department of Public Safety to protest the state’s strict immigration law, SB 1070. And for some, it’s just sport. Given this randomness, it’s impossible to predict the need for professional distributed denial-of-service mitigation. For example, Teolis says one of DOSarrest ‘s customers was the Dog Whisperer, that guru of man’s best friend. “If Cesar Millan can get attacked, anyone is fair game,” he says. Purchasing mitigation services requires the same kind of budgeting as any form of IT security: What you spend on controls should be proportional to the value of the data or website. So, while any organization with an online presence is at some risk, those with financial or reputational assets that could be seriously damaged by going dark should take DDoS mitigation most seriously. Everyone should take these preparatory steps. > > Do online reconnaissance: Follow what’s being said about your company online, particularly on public social networks, and look for chatter that might hint at extortion or hacktivism. Subscribe to security threat assessment reports covering the latest DDoS techniques and incidents. Prolexic is one source for threat advisories; US-CERT also has overviews, like this one on Anonymous. > > Heed threat mitigation recommendations: DDoS threat reports typically include details about the attack signature and recommended mitigation steps. For example, a recent Prolexic report on the High Orbit Ion Cannon identifies specific attack signatures, in this case HTTP requests, and content filter rules to block them. For L3/L4 attacks, incorporate these rules into your firewall; do likewise for L7 attacks if your firewall supports application-layer filtering. > > Have a communications strategy: Know what you’ll tell employees, customers, and the media should you be the victim of an attack. Don’t wait to make statements up on the fly. > > Have an emergency mitigation backup plan: Although most DDoS mitigation services operate on a monthly subscription basis, if you haven’t signed up and an attack overwhelms your defenses, at least know who you’re gonna call. Quinn and Teolis say their services can be operational and filtering DDoS traffic within minutes, though of course it will cost you. What To Look For In DDoS Mitigation At the risk of oversimplification, DDoS mitigation services are fundamentally remote network traffic filters. Once your system detects an attack affecting your network or servers, you redirect traffic to the service; the service filters out the junk and passes legitimate packets to their original destinations. In this sense, it’s like a cloud-based spam filter for websites. This traffic redirection, so-called on-ramping, is typically done via DNS. The mitigation provider creates a virtual IP address, the customer makes a DNS A record (hostname) change pointing to the remote VIPA, traffic flows through the mitigation provider’s filters, and the provider forwards only legitimate traffic on to the original site. Those facing attacks on multiple systems can divert entire subnets using Border Gateway Protocol advertisements, using Generic Routing Encapsulation tunneling to direct traffic to the mitigation provider. Advertising a new route to an entire address block protects an entire group of machines and, says Quinn, has the advantage of being asymmetrical, in that the mitigation service is used only for inbound traffic. The most important DDoS mitigation features are breadth of attack coverage, speed of service initiation (traffic on-ramping), and traffic capacity. Given the increasing popularity of application-layer attacks, any service should include both L3/4 and L7 mitigation technology. Services may segment features into proactive, before-the-attack monitoring and reactive, during-the-incident mitigation. Customers with monthly subscriptions should demand typical and maximum mitigation times–measured in minutes, not hours–backed up by a service-level agreement with teeth. Even those procuring emergency mitigation services should expect fairly rapid response. Most DDoS specialists staff operations centers 24/7. With DDoS mitigation, procrastination can be expensive. For those 70% of customers who first turn to DOSarrest in an emergency, the setup fee for the first month is around $3,500 to $4,000, depending on the complexity of the site. In contrast, an average monthly cost on a subscription basis is $700 per public-facing IP address. Filtered bandwidth is another way to differentiate between services. Some, like Prolexic, adopt an all-you-can-eat pricing model. For a flat fee per server, customers can use the service as often as they need with as much bandwidth as required. Others, like DOSarrest , keep the “use as often as you like” model but include only a certain amount of clean bandwidth (10 Mbps in its case) in the base subscription, charging extra for higher-bandwidth tiers. Teolis says 10 Mbps is sufficient for at least 90% of his company’s customers. A few services use a pricing model akin to an attorney’s retainer, with a low monthly subscription but hefty fees for each DDoS incident. Richter says Savvis is moving to this model, saying that customers want usage-based pricing that resembles other cloud services. Prolexic’s Quinn counters that this pricing structure leads to unpredictable bills. Bottom line, there’s a DDoS service to suit your tolerance for risk and budgetary volatility. Optional services available from some providers include postattack analysis and forensics (what happened, from where, and by whom) and access to a managed network reputation database that tracks active botnets and sites linked to fraudulent or criminal activity, a feature that facilitates automated blacklisting to help prevent attacks in the first place. Aside from looking at service features, evaluate each company’s technical expertise and track record. DDoS mitigation specialists, for whom this is a core business (or perhaps their only business) arguably have more experience and focus than Internet service providers or managed security providers for which DDoS mitigation is just a sideline. Not surprisingly, Quinn, whose company was among the first to offer DDoS mitigation as a service, suggests customers should make vendors show evidence that DDoS mitigation is something they do regularly, not as a rare occurrence. Make sure the service has highly qualified staff dedicated to the task. Ask whether the provider has experts available 24/7 and how long it will take to access someone with the technical ability and authority to work on your problem. Unfortunately there’s no rule of thumb for measuring the DDoS mitigation return on investment; it’s really a case-by-case calculation based on the financial value of the site being attacked. It relies on factors such as the cost in lost revenue or organizational reputation for every minute of downtime. Quinn cites a common analyst cost estimate, which Cisco also uses in its product marketing, of $30 million for a 24-hour outage at a large e-commerce site. There’s a cruel asymmetry to DDoS attacks: They can cost thousands to mitigate, inflict millions in damage, and yet attackers can launch them on the cheap. A small botnet can be rented for as little as $600 a month, meaning a serious, sustained attack against multiple targets can be pulled off for $5,000 or $10,000. With damages potentially two or three orders of magnitude higher than the DDoS mitigation costs, many organizations are finding mitigation a worthwhile investment. In fact, three-quarters of DOSarrest ‘s customers don’t wait for a DDoS attack to flip the switch, but permanently filter all of their traffic through the service. That makes sense, particularly if it’s a high-value or high-visibility site, if your traffic fits within the cap, or if you’re using an uncapped service like Prolexic. These services use the same sorts of colocation hosting centers where companies would typically house public-facing websites, and they do geographically distributed load balancing and traffic routing to multiple data centers. That makes the risk of downtime on the provider’s end minimal. And this approach could actually reduce WAN costs since it filters junk before it ever touches your systems. Recommendations If a mitigation service is too expensive, there are things IT can do to lower the exposure and limit the damage from DDoS attacks (discussed more in depth in our full report): 1. Fortify your edge network: Ensure that firewall and IDS systems have DoS features turned on, including things like dropping spoofed or malformed packets, setting SYN, ICMP, and UDP flood drop thresholds, limiting connections per server and client, and dynamically filtering and automatically blocking (at least for a short time) clients sending bad packets. 2. Develop a whitelist of known good external systems: These include business partner gateways, ISP links and cloud providers. This ensures that stringent edge filtering, whether done on your firewall or by a DDoS service, lets good traffic through. 3. Perform regular audits and reviews of your edge devices: Look for anomalies like bandwidth spikes. This works best if the data is centrally collected and analyzed across every device in your network. 4. Understand how to identify DDoS traffic: Research attack signatures and have someone on your network team who knows how to use a packet sniffer to discriminate between legitimate and DDoS traffic. 5. Prepare DNS: Lower the DNS TTL for public-facing Web servers, since these are most likely to be attacked. If you need to protect an entire server subnet, have a plan to readvertise BGP routes to a mitigation service. 6. Keep public Web servers off your enterprise ISP link: With Web servers being the most common DDoS target, Michael Davis, CEO of Savid Technologies and a regular InformationWeek contributor, recommends Web hosting with a vendor that doesn’t share your pipes. “Your website may be down, but at least the rest of your business is up,” says Davis. 7. Practice good server and application security hygiene: Layer 7 attacks exploit operating system and application security flaws, often using buffer overflows to inject attack code into SQL databases or Web servers, so keep systems patched. For DDoS protection please click here . Source: Darkreading

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How To Select A Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDoS’ Mitigation Service

Waring: Hackers can break into your Cisco TelePresence sessions, One of the Methods through Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDoS’ attack

If you rely on Cisco TelePresence products for sensive business communications, you might want to stop what you are doing and pay attention to a new warning that hackers can exploit security flaws to execute arbitrary code, cause a denial-of-service condition, or inject malicious commands. Cisco released four separate security advisories today to warn of the risks and urge TelePresence users to deploy patches, especially in sensitive business environments. If you think this might just be a theoretical threat, take a look at what HD Moore (of Metasploit fame) demonstrated for the New York Times earlier this year. The skinny from Cisco: Advisory #1: Cisco TelePresence Recording Server contains the following vulnerabilities: Cisco TelePresence Malformed IP Packets Denial of Service Vulnerability Cisco TelePresence Web Interface Command Injection Cisco TelePresence Cisco Discovery Protocol Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Exploitation of the Cisco TelePresence Malformed IP Packets Denial of Service Vulnerability may allow a remote, unauthenticated attacker to create a denial of service condition, preventing the product from responding to new connection requests and potentially causing some services and processes to crash. Exploitation of the Cisco TelePresence Web Interface Command Injection may allow an authenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system with elevated privileges. Exploitation of the Cisco TelePresence Cisco Discovery Protocol Remote Code Execution Vulnerability may allow allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges. Advisory #2: Cisco TelePresence Multipoint Switch contains the following vulnerabilities: Cisco TelePresence Malformed IP Packets Denial of Service Vulnerability Cisco TelePresence Cisco Discovery Protocol Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Exploitation of the Cisco TelePresence Malformed IP Packets Denial of Service Vulnerability may allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to create a denial of service (DoS) condition, causing the product to become unresponsive to new connection requests and potentially leading to termination services and processes. Exploitation of the Cisco TelePresence Cisco Discovery Protocol Remote Code Execution Vulnerability may allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges. Advisory #3: Cisco TelePresence Manager contains the following vulnerabilities: Cisco TelePresence Malformed IP Packets Denial of Service Vulnerability Cisco TelePresence Cisco Discovery Protocol Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Exploitation of the Cisco TelePresence Malformed IP Packets Denial of Service Vulnerability may allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to create a denial of service (DoS) condition, causing the product to become unresponsive to new connection requests and potentially leading to termination services and processes. Exploitation of the Cisco TelePresence Cisco Discovery Protocol Remote Code Execution Vulnerability may allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges. Advisory #4: Cisco TelePresence Endpoint devices contain the following vulnerabilities: Cisco TelePresence API Remote Command Execution Vulnerability Cisco TelePresence Remote Command Execution Vulnerability Cisco TelePresence Cisco Discovery Protocol Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Exploitation of the API Remote Command Execution vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to inject commands into API requests.  The injected commands will be executed by the underlying operating system in an elevated context. Exploitation of the Remote Command Execution vulnerability could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to inject commands into requests made to the Administrative Web interface.  The injected commands will be executed by the underlying operating system in an elevated context. Exploitation of the Cisco TelePresence Cisco Discovery Protocol Remote Code Execution Vulnerability may allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges. Summary: Major security holes in the Cisco TelePresence product line could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, cause a denial-of-service condition, or inject commands. Source: http://www.zdnet.com/hackers-can-break-into-your-cisco-telepresence-sessions-7000000825/

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Waring: Hackers can break into your Cisco TelePresence sessions, One of the Methods through Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDoS’ attack

Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDoS’ attack on Online websites

As more enterprises push services online, IT executives should be wary of the legal risks which could occur if they are subject to a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, finds Hamish Barwick. It could be an IT executive’s nightmare — finding out the company website has been hit with a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack and can’t be accessed by customers. Both customers and management are demanding to know what’s happening. And worse still, there is evidence that customer data has been compromised. It’s at that time that an IT security contingency plan begins to pay off. For Middletons partner, Mark Feetham — who specialises in ICT law — having a contingency plan in place before the worse happens can help companies avoid loss of business or a potential lawsuit. “Companies that fail to do any planning to address a DDoS threat may be exposed to a negligence claim if an attack is launched against it which causes a third party to suffer a security breach, data or privacy loss,” he says. This IT security contingency plan could include taking proactive steps to ensuring that proper logging is configured in all security devices, so that in the event of an attack, the log data can be examined and handed over to law enforcement agencies. In addition, having a security awareness program developed by the CIO and distributed to all staff members was needed. “Education and awareness of security threats throughout any organisation is key to minimising threats and reducing risk,” Feetham says. He also warns that companies that use Cloud computing services may also be at risk as a DDoS attack could limit or preclude access by the company to its own data or business applications. “Organisations considering Cloud computing as an option must carefully balance the issues against any identified cost saving associated with a switch to Cloud,” Feetham says. “Adequate due diligence on a prospective provider and careful consideration of the terms of the Cloud services contract are strongly recommended.” Gilbert + Tobin’s Andrew Hii says any negligence claim following a DDoS attack will be determined by what the company has done to protect its data. “If the DDoS attack was to stop people from using that website to perform a transaction and those people suffered losses as a result there might be the potential for a negligence claim to be brought against the company,” he says. Regardless of DDoS attacks, Hii adds that companies should make sure that any Cloud provider they go with has in place sufficient security measures. “Insuring that any Cloud provider or outsourcer has best practice standards goes a long way to dealing with those risks,” he says, If the negligence case makes it to court, than having evidence which shows the company’s obligation to its customers is essential, according to Hii. “Record keeping is just as important in any case where a company may be exposed to this kind of liability.” Source: http://www.cio.com.au/article/430050/avoiding_negligence_claims_online/

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Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDoS’ attack on Online websites

FBI warning Web Users on July 9th possible Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDoS’ attack

When the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) publicly announces a possible catastrophic event, people should better pay attention. There’s big news that a huge number of people around the world might suffer “Internet Blackouts”, meaning, they won’t be able to access the Web at all on their computers starting July 9, 2012. This Denial Of Service (DOS)-type scheme is related to a computer Trojan called DNS Changer Malware. This type of malware performs some illicit activity on the computer system when it is run and can allow somebody from a remote site to take control of another computer. When you’re infected by this DNS Changer, it changes your computer’s Domain Name Server (DNS) to replace your ISP’s provided good DNS servers with rougue DNS servers operated by the DNS Changer author or criminal, in order to divert traffic to fake and illegal sites on the Web and steal your personal informations such as credit card numbers, passwords and usernames, among other things. In November of 2011, in their “Operation Ghost Click”, the FBI successfully shut down the DNS Changer Botnet using a number of their own DNS servers just to maintain the DNS services of millions of unsuspected victims around the world. This would expire on July 9, 2012. The DNS Changer Malware is targeting Windows PCs to other platforms that include the Mac OS and home routers as well. Mobile devices may also be affected. Meanwhile, a technology news blog has written some helpful information on how to check if your computer is affected by this rogue malware and what steps you can do to prevent and get rid of this menacing DNS Changer Malware infection on your computers. The FBI claimed and admitted that they organized a very unusual system to combat this Trojan malware in the private and Internet domain. While this is the first time the U.S. government intervened to such a problem, the FBI said it wouldn’t be the last of it. Source: http://technorati.com/technology/article/fbi-to-web-users-many-could/

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FBI warning Web Users on July 9th possible Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDoS’ attack

Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDoS’ blackmailers busted in cross-border swoop

Cyber hoodlums targeted gold and silver traders Chinese and Hong Kong cops are hailing another success in their cross-border cyber policing efforts with the scalp of a high profile DDoS blackmail gang which targeted gold, silver and securities traders in the former British colony. Six cyber hoodlums were arrested on the mainland in Hunan, Hubei, Shanghai and other locations at the end of June, according to a report in local Hong Kong rag The Standard. Some 16 Hong Kong-based firms including the Chinese Gold & Silver Exchange were targeted in the scheme designed to blackmail them to the tune of 460,000 yuan (£46,200). The gang apparently threatened to cripple their victims’ web operations with distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks if they didn’t cough up. Four of the targeted firms transferred funds totalling 290,000 yuan (£29,150) into designated bank accounts in mainland China, the report said. A source also told The Standard that some of the victims may have been involved in some shady dealings themselves, which made them more reluctant to seek police help. Roy Ko, centre manager of the Hong Kong Computer Emergency Response Team (HKCERT) told The Reg that the arrests are an indication of improving cross-border cyber policing efforts. “Working with counterparts cross border is always a challenge because of different practices, languages, different time zones and so on. Usually, HK and the mainland maintain a good working relationship, just like the HKCERT and CNCERT,” he said. “Because we are in the same time zone, the response is usually quicker than working with the US, for example, where we have to wait until the next day to get a response.” Ko also warned that the attacks show this form of cyber threat is still a popular one for avaricious criminal gangs. “Firms have to assess whether they are a probable target of such an attack – ie whether they rely heavily on the internet to do business – and then prepare countermeasures,” he added. “Subscribing to an anti-DDoS service may be part of the protection strategy in addition to anti-malware, firewall, etc.” Hong Kong businesses have been warned before that they’re fair game to hackers from neighbouring China. Source: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/07/04/hong_kong_china_bust_ddos_gang_blackmail/

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Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDoS’ blackmailers busted in cross-border swoop

Legal blog site suffered Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDoS’ attack

When a blog that typically attracts 30,000 visitors a day is hit with 5.35 million, its operators had better have been prepared for what seems way too big to be called a spike. The popular SCOTUSblog, which provides news and information about the United States Supreme Court, was put to this test last week after the historic healthcare ruling and it passed with flying colors, thanks to months of planning and a willingness to spend $25,000. “We knew we needed to do whatever it took to make sure we were capable of handling what we knew would be the biggest day in this blog’s history,” says Max Mallory, deputy manager of the blog, who coordinates the IT. The massive traffic spike was somewhat of a perfect storm for SCOTUSblog, which Supreme Court litigator Tom Goldstein of the Washington, D.C., boutique Goldstein & Russell founded in 2002. Not only is the site a respected source of Supreme Court news and information, but in the days leading up to the ruling, buzz about the blog itself began picking up. President Barack Obama’s press secretary named SCOTUSblog as being one source White House officials would monitor to hear news from the court. When the news broke, two of the first media organizations to report it — Fox News and CNN — got the ruling wrong. Many media outlets cited SCOTUSblog as being the first to correctly report that the Supreme Court upheld the Affordable Care Act in a 5-4 decision. But even before “decision day,” as Mallory calls it, the small team at SCOTUSblog knew Thursday would put a lot of strain on the blog’s IT infrastructure. The first indications came during the health care arguments at the Supreme Court in March, when SCOTUSblog received almost 1 million page views over the three days of deliberations. The blog’s single server at Web hosting company Media Temple just couldn’t handle the traffic. “That was enough to crash our site at various points throughout those days and it just generally kept us slow for a majority of the time the arguments were going on,” Mallory says. In the weeks leading up to the decision, Mallory worked with a hired team of developers to optimize the website’s Java code, install the latest plugins and generally tune up the site. Mallory realized that wouldn’t be enough, though. No one knew for sure when the high court would release the most anticipated Supreme Court case in years, but each day it didn’t happen there was a greater chance it would come down the next day. Traffic steadily climbed leading up to the big day: The week before the ruling the site saw 70,000 visitors. Days before the decision, the site got 100,000. “It became clear we weren’t going to be able to handle the traffic we were expecting to see when the decision was issued,” Mallory says. A week before the decision, Mallory reached out to Sound Strategies, a website optimization company that works specifically with WordPress. The Sound Strategies team worked throughout the weekend recoding the SCOTUSblog site again, installing high-end caching plugins, checking for script conflicts and cleaning out old databases from previous plugins that had been removed. The team also installed Nginx, the open source Web server, to run on the Media Temple hardware. All of the improvements helped, but when the decision did not come on Tuesday, July 26, it became clear that Thursday, July 28, the last day of the court’s term, would be decision day. Mallory was getting worried: Earlier in the week SCOTUSblog suffered a distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack targeting the website. That couldn’t happen on Thursday, when the court would issue the ruling. “This was our time, it just had to work,” Mallory says. The night before decision day, Mallory and Sound Strategies took drastic measures. Mallory estimated the site could see between 200,000 and 500,000 hits the next day, so the group decided to purchase four additional servers from Media Temple, which Sound Strategies configured overnight. SCOTUSblog ended up with a solution Thursday morning that had a main server acting as a centralized host of SCOTUSblog, with four satellite servers hosting cached images of the website that were updated every six minutes. A live blog providing real-time updates — which was the first to correctly report the news — was hosted by CoveritLive, a live blogging service. As 10 a.m. EDT approached, the system began being put to the test. At 10:03, the site was handling 1,000 requests per second. By 10:04 it had reached 800,000 total page views. That number climbed to 1 million by 10:10, and by 10:30 the site had received 2.4 million hits. Because of the satellite caching, Mallory says, the site was loading faster during peak traffic than it ever had before. In post-mortem reviews, Sound Strategies engineers said they found evidence of two DDoS attacks, one at 9:45 a.m. and another at 10 a.m., which the servers were able to absorb. “We built this fortress that was used basically for two hours that morning,” Mallory says. “It worked and it never slowed down.” Since the healthcare decision, SCOTUSblog has seen higher-than-normal traffic, but nowhere near the 5 million page views the site amassed on the biggest day in the blog’s history. “It was a roller coaster,” Mallory says. “You can have the best analysis, the fastest, most accurate reporting, but if your website crashes and no one can see it that moment, it doesn’t matter.” Source: http://www.arnnet.com.au/article/429473/how_legal_blog_survived_traffic_tidal_wave_after_court_healthcare_ruling/?fp=4&fpid=1090891289

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Legal blog site suffered Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDoS’ attack

Distributed Denial of Service `DDoS` mitigation a key component in network security

`Attacker motivations behind distributed denial-of-service attacks (DDoS) have shifted away from solely financial (for example, the extortion of online gambling sites and retailers) toward socially and politically motivated campaigns against government websites, media outlets and even small businesses. Hacktivist collectives such as Anonymous, LulzSec and others have used DDoS attacks to damage a target’s reputation or revenue since December 2010 when Anonymous began targeting corporate websites that opposed Wikileaks. At that time, attacks were conducted using botnets to flood sites’ servers with large quantities of TCP or UDP packets, effectively shutting down the sites for hours at a time. Today, botmasters have begun to use more complex strategies that focus on specific areas of the network, such as email servers or Web applications. Others divert security teams’ attention with DDoS flood attacks while live hackers obtain the actual objective, valuable corporate or personal information. This tactic was utilized in the infamous attack against Sony in 2011, according to Carlos Morales, the vice president of global sales engineering and operations at Chelmsford, Mass.-based DDoS mitigation vendor Arbor Networks Inc. Rapid growth in the sophistication of DDoS attacks combined with the prevalence of attacks across markets makes for a dangerous and fluid attack landscape. Security researchers and providers agree that it’s becoming more important for companies to protect themselves from denial-of-service attacks, in addition to implementing other measures of network security. DDoS attacks can quickly cripple a company financially. A recent survey from managed DNS provider Neustar, for example, said outages could cost a company up to $10,000 per hour. Neustar’s survey, “DDoS Survey Q1 2012: When Businesses Go Dark” (.pdf), reported 75% of respondents (North American telecommunication, travel, finance, IT and retail companies who had undergone a DDoS attack) used firewalls, routers, switches or an intrusion detection system to combat DDoS attacks. Their researchers say equipment is more often part of the problem than the solution. “They quickly become bottlenecks, helping achieve an attacker’s goal of slowing or shutting you down,” the report stated. “Moreover, firewalls won’t repel attacks on the application layer, an increasingly popular DDoS vector.” For those reasons, experts suggest companies with the financial and human resources incorporate DDoS-specific mitigation technology or services into their security strategy. Service providers such as Arbor Networks, Prolexic and others monitor traffic for signs of attacks and can choke them off before downtime, floods of customer support calls, and damage to brand or reputation occur. Purchasing DDoS mitigation hardware requires hiring and training of employees with expertise in the area, but experts say that can be even more expensive. “In general, it’s very hard to justify doing self-mitigation,” said Ted Swearingen, the director of the Neustar security operations center. All the additional steps a company has to take to implement their own DDoS mitigation tool, such as widening bandwidth, increasing firewalls, working with ISPs, adding security monitoring and hiring experts to run it all, make it a cost-ineffective strategy in the long term, he said.  Three percent of the companies in Neustar’s survey reported using that type of protection. In some cases, smaller DDoS mitigation providers even turn to larger vendors for support when they find themselves facing an attack too large, too complex or too new to handle on their own. Secure hosting provider VirtualRoad.org is an example. The company provides protection from DDoS attacks for independent media outlets in countries facing political and social upheaval—places where censorship by the government or other sources is rampant, such as Iran, Burma and Zimbabwe. A specific niche like that in a narrow market with small clients doesn’t usually require extra support, but VirtualRoad.org has utilized its partnership with Prolexic a few times in the last year, according to CTO Tord Lundström. They have their infrastructure to deal with attacks, Lundström said, but they also have parameters for the volume and complexity that they can handle. When it gets to be too much, they route the traffic to Prolexic, a security firm that charges a flat fee regardless of how many times you are attacked. “It’s easy to say, ‘We’ll do it when an attack comes,’ and then when an attack comes they say, ‘Well, you have to pay us more or we won’t protect you,’” Lundström said of other services. Extra fees like that are often the reason why those who need quality DDoS protection, especially small businesses like VirtualRoad.org clients, can’t afford it, he said. The impact can be worse for companies if the DDoS attack is being used as a diversion. According to a recent survey by Arbor Networks, 27% of respondents had been the victims of multi-vector attacks. The “Arbor Special Report: Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report,” which polled 114 self-classified Tier 1, Tier 2 and other IP network operators from the U.S. and Canada, Latin/South America, EMEA, Africa and Asia, stated that not only is the complexity of attacks growing, but the size as well. In 2008, the largest observed attack was about 40 Gbps. Last year, after an unusual spike to 100 Gbps in 2010, the largest recorded attack was 60 Gbps. This denotes a steady increase in the size of attacks, but Morales of Arbor Networks believes the numbers will eventually begin to plateau because most networks can be brought down with far smaller attacks, around 10 Gbps. Even if they stop growing, however, DDoS attacks won’t stop happening altogether, Morales said. Not even the change to IPv6 will stop the barrage of daily attacks, as some were already recorded in the report. Because of the steady nature of this attack strategy, experts suggest all companies that function online prepare themselves for this type of attack by doing away with the “it won’t happen to me” attitude. Luckily, recent “hacktivist” activities have given DDoS attacks enough press that CSOs and CEOs are starting to pay attention, but that’s just the first step, Morales said. It’s important to follow through with getting the protection your business needs if you want to achieve the goal, said VirtualRoad.org’s Lundström. “The goal is to keep doing the work,” he said. Source: http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/2240159017/DDoS-mitigation-a-key-component-in-network-security

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Distributed Denial of Service `DDoS` mitigation a key component in network security

Banking Outage Prevention Tips

A series of fresh technology shutdowns this spring at banks around the world reveals the financial services industry still has a long way to go toward ensuring full up time for networks, as well as communicating with the public about why tech glitches have happened and what is being done about them. In May, Santander, Barclays and HSBC were all hit by digital banking outages. Some customers of Barclays and Santander were unable to access accounts online for a time near the end of the month, an outage blamed largely on end-of-the-month transaction volume. At HSBC, an IT hardware failure temporarily rendered ATMs unable to dispense cash or accept card payments in the U.K. Barclays and Santander both apologized for the outages though statements, while HSBC’s approach revealed both the power and peril of social media in such cases. HSBC’s PR office took to social media to communicate updates on the outage, and to also receive criticism about the outage (HSBC, Santander and Barclays did not return queries for comment). After an earlier outage in November, HSBC had set up a social monitoring team to be more proactive about communicating with the public about tech glitches, a move that seemed to have some positive impact, as not all of the Twitter and Facebook postings about the most recent outage were complaints. The basic task of making sure the rails are working, and smoothing things over with customers when systems invariably shut down, is an even more pressing matter considering the propensity for outrage to spread quickly among the public via new channels. “One thing that’s true about outages is we’re hearing more about them. The prevalence of social media use by irate customers and even employees makes these outages more publicized,” says Jacob Jegher, a senior analyst at Celent. Jegher says the use of social media for outage communication is tough – balancing the need to communicate with customers with internal tech propriety is easier said than done. “While it’s certainly not the institution’s job nor should it be their job to go into every technical detail, it’s helpful to provide some sort of consistent messaging with updates, so customers know that the bank is listening to them,” Jegher says. National Australia Bank, which suffered from a series of periodic online outages about a year ago that left millions of people unable to access paychecks, responded with new due diligence and communications programs. In an email response to BTN, National Australia Bank Chief Information Officer Adam Bennett said the bank has since reduced incident numbers by as much as 40 percent through a project that has aimed to improve testing. He said that if an incident does occur, the bank communicates via social media channels, with regular updates and individual responses to consumers where possible. The bank also issued an additional statement to BTN, saying “while the transaction and data demands on systems have grown exponentially in recent years led by online and mobile banking, the rate of incidents has steadily declined due to a culture of continuous improvement…The team tests and uses a range of business continuity plans. While we don’t disclose the specifics, whenever possible we will evoke these plans to allow the customer experience to continue uninterrupted.” While communicating information about outages is good, it’s obviously better to prevent them in the first place. Coastal Bank & Trust, a $66 million-asset community bank based in Wilmington, N.C., has outsourced its monitoring and recovery, using disaster recovery support from Safe Systems, a business continuity firm, to vet for outage threats, supply backup server support in the event of an outage, and contribute to the bank’s preparation and response to mandatory yearly penetration and vulnerability tests. “Safe Systems makes sure that the IP addresses are accessible and helps with those scans,” says Renee Rhodes, chief compliance and operations officer for Coastal Bank & Trust. The bank has also outsourced security monitoring to Gladiator, a Jack Henry enterprise security monitoring product that scours the bank’s IT network to flag activity that could indicate a potential outage or external attack. The security updates include weekly virus scans and patches. Coastal Bank & Trust’s size – it has only 13 employees – makes digital banking a must for competitive reasons, which increases both the threat of downtime and the burden of maintaining access. “We do mobile, remote deposit capture, all of the products that the largest banks have. I am a network administrator, and one of my co-workers is a security officer. With that being said, none of us has an IT background,” Rhodes says. “I don’t know if I could put a number on how important it is to have these systems up and running.” Much of the effort toward managing downtime risk is identifying and thwarting external threats that could render systems inoperable for a period of time. Troy Bradley, chief technology officer at FIS, says the tech firm has noticed an increase in external denial of service attacks recently, which is putting the entire banking and financial services technology industries on alert for outage and tech issues with online banking and other platforms. “You’ll see a lot of service providers spending time on this. It’s not the only continuity requirement to solve, but it’s one of the larger ones,” he says. To mitigate downtime risk for its hosted solutions, FIS uses virtualization to backstop the servers that run financial applications, such as web banking or mobile banking. That creates a “copy” of that server for redundancy purposes, and that copy can be moved to another data center if necessary. “We can host the URL (that runs the web enabled service on behalf of the bank) at any data center…if we need to move the service or host it across multiple data centers we can do that…we think we have enough bandwidth across these data centers to [deal with] any kind of denial of service attack that a crook can come up with,” Bradley says. FIS also uses third party software to monitor activity at its data centers in Brown Deer, WI; Little Rock and Phoenix, searching for patterns that can anticipate a denial of service attack early and allow traffic connected to its clients to be routed to one of the other two data centers. For licensed solutions, FIS sells added middleware that performs a similar function, creating a redundant copy of a financial service that can be stored and accessed in the case of an emergency. Stephanie Balaouras, a vice president and research director for security and risk at Forrester Research, says virtualization is a good way to mitigate both performance issues, such as systems being overwhelmed by the volume of customer transactions, and operational issues such as hardware failure, software failure, or human error. “If it’s [performance], the bank needs to revisit its bandwidth and performance capacity. With technologies like server virtualization, it shouldn’t be all that difficult for a large bank to bring additional capacity online in advance of peak periods or specific sales and marketing campaigns that would increase traffic to the site. The same technology would also allow the bank to load-balance performance across all of its servers – non-disruptively. The technology is never really the main challenge, it tends to be the level of maturity and sophistication of the IT processes for capacity planning, performance management, incident management, automation, etc.,” she says. In the case of operational issues, server virtualization is still a great technology, Balaouras says, adding it allows the bank to restart failed workloads within minutes to alternate physical servers in the environment or even to another other data center. “You can also configure virtual servers in high-availability or fault-tolerant pairs across physical servers so that one hardware failure cannot take down a mission-critical application or service,” Balaouras says. Balaouras says more significant operational failures, such as a storage area network (SAN) failure, pose a greater challenge to network continuity and back up efforts. “In this case, you would need to recover from a backup. But more than likely a bank should treat this as ‘disaster’ and failover operations to another data center where there is redundant IT infrastructure,” she says. Source: http://www.americanbanker.com/btn/25_7/online-banking-outage-prevention-strategies-1050405-1.html

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Banking Outage Prevention Tips

Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDoS’ Attacks: The Zemra Bot

Symantec has become aware of a new Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) crimeware bot known as “Zemra” and detected by Symantec as Backdoor.Zemra. Lately, this threat has been observed performing denial-of-service attacks against organizations with the purpose of extortion. Zemra first appeared on underground forums in May 2012 at a cost of €100. This crimeware pack is similar to other crime packs, such as Zeus and SpyEye, in that is has a command-and-control panel hosted on a remote server. This allows it to issue commands to compromised computers and act as the gateway to record the number of infections and bots at the attacker’s disposal. Similar to other crimeware kits, the functionality of Zemra is extensive: 256-bit DES encryption/decryption for communication between server and client DDoS attacks Device monitoring Download and execution of binary files Installation and persistence in checking to ensure infection Propagation through USB Self update Self uninstall System information collection However, the main functionality is the ability to perform a DDoS attack on a remote target computer of the user’s choosing. Initially, when a computer becomes infected, Backdoor.Zemra dials home through HTTP (port 80) and performs a POST request sending hardware ID, current user agent, privilege indication (administrator or not), and the version of the OS. This POST request gets parsed by gate.php, which splits out the information and stores it in an SQL database. It then keeps track of which compromised computers are online and ready to receive commands. Inspection of the leaked code allowed us to identify two types of DDoS attacks that have been implemented into this bot: HTTP flood SYN flood The first type, HTTP flood, opens a raw socket connection, but has special options to close the socket gracefully without waiting for a response (e.g. SocketOptionName.DontLinger). It then closes the socket on the client side and launches a new connection with a sleep interval. This is similar to a SYN flood, whereby a number of connection requests are made by sending multiple SYNs. No ACK is sent back upon receiving the SYN-ACK as the socket has been closed. This leaves the server-side Transmission Control Blocks (TCBs) in a SYN-RECEIVED state. The second type, SYN flood, is a simple SYN flood attack whereby multiple connects() are called, causing multiple SYN packets to be sent to the target computer. This is done in an effort to create a backlog of TCB creation requests, thereby exhausting the server and denying access to real requests. Symantec added detection for this threat under the name Backdoor.Zemra, which became active on June 25, 2012. To reduce the possibility of being infected by this Trojan, Symantec advises users to ensure that they are using the latest Symantec protection technologies with the latest antivirus definitions installed. Source: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/ddos-attacks-zemra-bot

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Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDoS’ Attacks: The Zemra Bot

LulzSec Members Confess To Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDoS’ Attacks to SOCA, Sony and etc

Four alleged members of the LulzSec hacktivist group had their day in British court Monday. Two of the people charged–Ryan Cleary, 20, and Jake Leslie Davis, 19–appeared at Southwark Crown Court in England to enter guilty pleas against some of the charges against them, including hacking the public-facing websites of the CIA and Britain’s Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA). All told, Cleary, who’s from England, pleaded guilty to six of the eight charges lodged against him, including unauthorized access to Pentagon computers controlled by the U.S. Air Force. Meanwhile, Davis–who hails from Scotland’s Shetland Islands–pleaded guilty to two of the four charges made against him. The pair pleaded not guilty to two charges of violating the U.K.’s Serious Crime Act by having posted “unlawfully obtained confidential computer data” to numerous public websites–including LulzSec.com, PasteBin, and the Pirate Bay–to encourage or assist in further offenses, including “supplying articles for use in fraud.” They did, however, confess to launching numerous botnet-driven distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks under the banners of Anonymous, Internet Feds, and LulzSec. According to authorities, the pair targeted websites owned by the Arizona State Police, the Fox Broadcasting Company, News International, Nintendo, and Sony Pictures Entertainment. The pair have also been charged with targeting, amongst other organizations, HBGary, HBGary Federal, the Atlanta chapter of Infragard, Britain’s National Health Service, the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), and Westboro Baptist church. [ Learn about another hacker indictment. See Feds Bust Hacker For Selling Government Supercomputer Access. ] The two other alleged LulzSec members charged Monday are England-based Ryan Mark Ackroyd, 25, as well as a 17-year-old London student who hasn’t been named by authorities since he’s a minor. Both also appeared at Southwark Crown Court and pleaded not guilty to four charges made against them, including participating in DDoS attacks, as well as “encouraging or assisting an offense.” All four of the LulzSec accused are due to stand trial on the charges leveled against them–for offenses that allegedly took place between February and September 2011–on April 8, 2013. According to news reports, the court heard Monday that reviewing all of the evidence just for the charges facing Cleary will require 3,000 hours. Three of the accused have been released on bail. Cleary was not released; he had been released on conditional bail in June 2011, but violated his bail conditions by attempting to contact the LulzSec leader known as Sabu at Christmastime. LulzSec–at least in its original incarnation–was a small, focused spinoff from Anonymous, which itself sprang from the free-wheeling 4chan image boards. LulzSec was short for Lulz Security, with “lulz” (the plural of LOL or laugh out loud) generally referring to laughs gained at others’ expense. According to U.S. authorities, Davis often operated online using the handles topiary and atopiary, while Ackroyd was known online as lol, lolspoon, as well as a female hacker and botnet aficionado dubbed Kayla. What might be read into Ackroyd allegedly posing as a female hacker? According to Parmy Olson’s recently released book, We Are Anonymous, such behavior isn’t unusual in hacking forums, given the scarcity of actual women involved. “Females were a rare sight on image boards and hacking forums; hence the online catchphrase ‘There are no girls on the Internet,’ and why posing as a girl has been a popular tactic for Internet trolls for years,” wrote Olson. “But this didn’t spell an upper hand for genuine females. If they revealed their sex on an image board … they were often met with misogynistic comments.” In related LulzSec prosecution news, Cleary last week was also indicted by a Los Angeles federal grand jury on charges that overlap with some of the ones filed by British prosecutors. At least so far, however, U.S. prosecutors have signaled that they won’t be seeking Cleary’s extradition, leaving him to face charges in the United Kingdom. The shuttering of LulzSec both in the United States and Great Britain was facilitated by the efforts of SOCA, as well as the FBI, which first arrested Anonymous and LulzSec leader Sabu–real name, Hector Xavier Monsegur–in June 2011, then turned him into a confidential government informant before arresting him again, earlier this year, on a 12-count indictment. As revealed in a leaked conference call earlier this year, British and American authorities were working closely together to time their busts of alleged LulzSec and Anonymous operators on both sides of the Atlantic, apparently using evidence gathered by Monsegur. Source: informationweek

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LulzSec Members Confess To Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDoS’ Attacks to SOCA, Sony and etc